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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this consolidated appeal, Erica Lee Alcala appeals from the district
court's orders revoking her probation and executing the sentence previously
imposed upon her guilty plea to battery on a law enforcement officer, and from
the sentence imposed upon her guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.
She also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying her motion to
augment the record with transcripts from previous probation violation and
jurisdictional review hearings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2003, Cassia County law enforcement officers were dispatched
to a residence in response to a trespassing complaint.

(11/30/04 PSI, p.2.)

There, they observed Alcala and two men in the yard of the residence.

(Id.)

Alcala was slow and sluggish in her movements, stumbled as she walked, and
slurred her words. (Id.) When the officers ordered her to stop, Alcala tried to
enter the residence. (Id.) Alcala then physically resisted the officers' attempt to
arrest her for trespassing. (Id.) Once arrested, Alcala continued to resist, and
kicked one of the officers in the upper thigh. (Id.)
The state charged Alcala with battery on a law enforcement o'fficer, illegal
consumption of alcohol, disturbing the peace, trespassing, and resisting and
obstructing a police officer.

(#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.51-52; 11/30/04 PSI, p.5.)

Alcala failed to appear at the jury trial, and was arrested on a bench warrant
several weeks later. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.121, 128-130.) Alcala then pied guilty
1

to battery on a law enforcement officer, and the state agreed to dismiss the
associated misdemeanor charges.

(6/24/04 Tr., p.4, L.23 -

p.12, L.20.)

Sentencing was delayed for several months after Alcala failed to appear at both
her presentence investigation appointment and the sentencing hearing. (#38882
R., Vol. I, pp.144-158.) Finally, in December 2004, the district court entered a
unified four-year sentence with 18 months fixed, but suspended the sentence
and placed Alcala on probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.173-180.)
The state filed its first report of probation violation in September 2005.
(#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.186-189.) The state alleged that Alcala failed to make
ordered restitution payments, failed to report to ordered anger management
treatment, failed to obtain a substance abuse evaluation, tested positive for
cocaine use, admitted using methamphetamine, failed to maintain employment,
and failed to appear for scheduled supervision appointments. (Id.) Alcala failed
to appear for a probation violation hearing, and the district court issued a bench
warrant. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.203-211.) After she was taken back into custody,
Alcala admitted violating her probation.

(#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.232-235.) The

district court revoked probation and executed the originally imposed sentence,
but retained jurisdiction.

(Id.)

At the conclusion of the period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court suspended the remainder of Alcala's sentence and
placed her back on probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.238, 240-

244.)
The state filed its second report of probation violation in January 2007.
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.246-249.)

The state alleged that Alcala changed her
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residence without permission, failed to report in writing to her probation officer as
required, failed to seek or maintain full time employment, failed to pay required
supeNision fees, failed to complete an ordered cognitive self-change treatment
program, failed to complete ordered community supeNision, absconded from
probation, failed to pay required incarceration fees, and failed to make required
restitution payments. (Id.) Alcala was not taken into custody until approximately
10 months later, in November 2007.

(#38882 R., Vol. II, p.258.) Alcala then

admitted violating her probation. (#38882 R., Vol. II, p.265.) In January 2008,
the district court re-imposed the original sentence but placed Alcala back on
probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.270-275.)
In January 2009, Alcala was arrested and charged with misdemeanor
driving under the influence and failing to provide a valid driver's license. (#38882
R., Vol. II, pp.287-289; 2/22/11 PSI, p.7.) The state subsequently filed a third
report of probation violation in Alcala's battery on a law enforcement officer case.
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.282-284.) The state alleged Alcala committed the new
DUI and driver's license offenses, failed to pay supeNision fees, consumed
alcohol, refused a breath test after the DUI arrest, and was discharged from
ordered moral reconation therapy as a result of the DUI charge. (Id.) Alcala pied
guilty to the DUI and admitted violating her probation. (2/22/11 PSI, p. 7; #38882
R., Vol. II, pp.300-301.) The district court revoked Alcala's probation, executed
the originally imposed sentence, but retained jurisdiction for a second time.
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.320-323.)

In October 2009, at the conclusion of the

second period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the remainder
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of Alcala's sentence and again placed her back on probation for three years.
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.332-340.)

Nine days after being placed back on

probation, Alcala served two days discretionary time for failing to stay at her
reported residence. (#38882 R., Vol. II, p.341.)
In May 2010, Alcala was arrested again and charged with felony DUI,
driving on a suspended license, eluding a police officer, and obstructing and
delaying a police officer. (#38883 R., pp.52-55.) The state subsequently filed a
fourth report of probation violation in Alcala's battery on a law enforcement officer
case. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.350-353.) The fourth report of violation referenced
Alcala's new charges, and also alleged that Alcala failed to obtain and maintain
employment, consumed alcohol, failed to pay supervision fees, refused a breath
test after her DUI arrest, and was again discharged from ordered moral
reconation therapy as a result of her new DUI charge.

(Id.)

Alcala admitted

violating her probation. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.371-372; 9/14/10 Tr., p.58, L.10 p.60, L.10.) In September 2010, the district court agreed to release Alcala to the
House of Ruth, an inpatient treatment facility. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.374-375;
9/14/10 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.62, L.6.)

The court continued Alcala's felony DUI

proceedings and the disposition of the fourth probation violation until after
Alcala's completion of or discharge from the treatment facility. (#38882 R., Vol.
II, pp.374-375; 9/14/10 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.63, L.24.)
Ten days after being ordered into treatment, the House of Ruth director
reported that Alcala had become intoxicated, refused a request to submit to a
breath test, became combative, and fled the facility on foot. (#38882 R., Vol. II,
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p.376.) The state then filed its fr~h report of probation violation in Alcala's battery
on a law enforcement officer case. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.376-378.)

The state

alleged that Alcala consumed alcohol at the House of Ruth, and associated with
an individual who was on probation or parole. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.376-378.)
Before she could be taken into custody on the new probation violation, Alcala
was arrested again and charged with possession of a controlled substance, and
providing false information to a law enforcement officer. (2/22/11 PSI, pp.?, 9;
#38882 R., Vol. II, p.386.)
Alcala pied guilty to the felony DUI, and the state agreed to dismiss the
associated misdemeanor charges. (#38883 R., p.119; 12/30/10 Tr., p.10, L.16p.24, L.23.)

On the felony DUI, the district court entered a unified six-year

sentence with two years fixed, to run concurrent with Alcala's other cases.
(#38883 R., pp.103-106.) The district court also revoked probation on Alcala's
battery on a law enforcement officer case, and reimposed the original four-year
unified sentence with credit for 1,027 days served. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.403405.)

Alcala timely appealed both her felony DUI sentence, and the district

court's revocation of her probation on the battery on a law enforcement officer
case.

(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.414-416; #38883 R., pp.121-123.)

Supreme Court consolidated these two appeals.

The Idaho

(10/24/11 Order Granting

Alcala's Motion to Consolidate Appeals.)
After the appellate record was settled, Alcala requested and was granted
a first extension of time to file her Appellant's brief.
Extension of Time.)

(11/1/11 Order Granting

On December 5, 2011, the day Alcala's Appellant's brief
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was due on 1st extension, she filed a motion to augment the record and to
suspend the briefing schedule. (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.")

In this motion, Alcala

requested six then-unprepared transcripts associated with previous probation
violation and jurisdictional review hearings. (Id.)
The Idaho Supreme Court initially granted Alcala's motion to augment.
(12/22/11 "Order Granting Motion To Augment And To Suspend the Briefing
Schedule.") However, the same day the Supreme Court entered its order, the
state filed a partial objection to Alcala's motion. (12/22/11 "Objection in Part to
'Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in
Support Thereof."') The Idaho Supreme Court then withdrew its previous order
and denied Alcala's motion to augment the record as to five of the six requested
transcripts. (1/17/12 Order.) However, Cassia County still prepared each of the
requested transcripts. (2/27/12 Motion to Reconsider, p.2, attachments.) Alcala
attached these transcripts to her motion to reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's
order denying her motion to augment.

(2/27/12 Motion to Reconsider,

attachments.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Alcala's motion to reconsider.
(3/29/12 Order.) Alcala subsequently filed her Appellant's brief. (See generally
Appellant's brief.)

6

ISSUES
Alcala states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Alcala due process
and equal protection when it denied her access to the
requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion, in docket number
38883, when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years,
with two years fixed, upon Ms. Alcala, following her plea of
guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion, in docket number
38882, when it revoked probation?

(Appellant's brief, p.7)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Alcala failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated her
constitutional rights by denying her motion to augment the record with
irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Alcala failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified eight-year sentence, with two years fixed, upon her
guilty plea to felony driving under the influence?

3.

Has Alcala failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking her probation after her fifth probation violation?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Alcala Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Her
Constitutional Rights By Denying Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Transcripts

A.

Introduction
Alcala contends that by denying her motion to augment the appellate

record with transcripts associated with prior probation violation and jurisdictional
review hearings, the Idaho Supreme Court violated her constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection and effectively denied her effective assistance
of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.) Alcala has failed to establish
a violation of her constitutional rights, however, because she has failed to show
that the requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for
resolution of, the issues Alcala raises on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Alcala Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentations
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
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proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that ''will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show
that any omissions from the record prejudiced her ability to pursue the appeal.
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968)
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Alcala
"must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were
requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Alcala
has failed to carry this burden.
Alcala appeals only the district court's order revoking probation in her
battery on a law enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882) and the district
court's felony DUI sentence (Docket No. 38883). She has failed to adequately
explain, much less demonstrate, how transcripts of hearings associated with prior
probation violation and jurisdictional review hearings in the battery on a law
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enforcement officer case are necessary to decide these issues. To the contrary,
the record amply demonstrates that Alcala's motion to augment was properly
denied because she failed to show that the transcripts she requested were
necessary for adequate review of the district court's sentencing and probation
violation disposition decisions.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Alcala claims that
she is only required to make a "colorable argument" that she needs "items" to
complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) She
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide her (and
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record she desires unless the
state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or
frivolous."

(Appellant's brief, p.1 0; see also p.8 ("The only way a court can

constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").)

No

reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kl at

190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

kl at

191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was
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entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

kl

at 193. The Court noted it addressed a similar issue in

Draper, 372 U.S. 487, where the Court held that the government need not
provide transcripts that were not "'germane to consideration of the appeal, and a
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96).
However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary
to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the
defendant with resources to pay his own way."

ill at 195.

"Moreover, where the

grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete
transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript
or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds."

ill

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

ill at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

ill at 194-95.

See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).

11

In this case, Alcala contends that the Idaho Supreme Court erred by
denying her motion to augment the record with the following transcripts: (1) the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on December 7, 2007, following the
state's second report of probation violation; (2) the transcript of the probation
violation disposition hearing on January 8, 2008, following the state's second
report of probation violation; (3) the transcript of the probation violation admission
hearing held on March 10, 2009, following the state's third report of probation
violation; (4) the transcript of the probation violation disposition hearing held on
May 12, 2009, following the state's third report of probation violation; and (5) the
transcript of Alcala's second jurisdictional review hearing held on October 21,
2009. 1 (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof'.) However, Alcala has failed to show any of these
transcripts were relevant to either the district court's decision to revoke probation
or its sentencing determination.
There is no evidence that the district court had the transcripts in question
when it revoked Alcala's probation and sentenced her in March 2011. Because
these transcripts were never presented to the district court in relation to those
determinations, they were never part of the record before the district court and
1

Alcala also requested that the record be augmented with the transcript of the
admission hearing held on September 14, 2010, following the state's fourth
report of probation violation. (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof'.) Because Alcala's notice
of appeal was timely as to the district court's decision to revoke probation after
her fourth and fifth probation violations, the state did not object to this request,
and the Idaho Supreme Court granted it. (12/22/11 "Objection in Part to 'Motion
to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof'; 1/17/12 Order.) Thus, the 9/14/10 transcript is part of the appellate
record.
12

are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell,
124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never
before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d
985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new
allegations of fact and consider new evidence.").
There is also no evidence that the district court relied upon anything said
at the prior hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke Alcala's probation and
order her sentence executed, or in its sentencing determination. Alcala's mere
assertion that the district court may have relied on its own recollection of
statements made at the prior proceedings in later deciding whether to revoke her
probation is pure speculation and fails to show that the requested transcripts are
necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate review under the facts of
this case.
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Alcala
(Appellant's brief, p.15), that appellate "review [o'I] a sentence that is ordered into
execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons
why Hanington does not support Alcala's claim of entitlement to the requested
transcripts.
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First, unlike Hanington, Alcala does not challenge the sentence that was
ordered into execution following her period of probation in the battery on a law
enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882). 2 Instead, she argues only that the
district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation (see Appellant's brief,
pp.14-17), a decision that is capable of appellate review without resort to
information bearing on the reasonableness of the sentence that was ultimately
ordered into execution.
Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was
presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence
in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date
probation was finally revoked.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194

(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all
2

Alcala also challenges the sentence imposed in her felony DUI case in Docket
No. 38883.
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.) However, while the district court
properly referenced Alcala's criminal history and previous failures on community
supervision in sentencing Alcala for felony DUI, it does not follow that Alcala is
entitled to transcripts of probation violation and jurisdictional review hearings
from separate criminal cases in her appeal of that sentence. There is no
evidence that the court relied on anything said in those prior hearings in
sentencing Alcala for felony DUI. Without such a nexus between prior probation
hearings and sentencing hearings in separate cases, a state would be required
to provide transcripts of a defendant's entire criminal proceeding history every
time a district court referenced her prior record at sentencing.
14

of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78
(indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was
presented).
Alcala also contends that she is entitled to the transcripts of previous
probation violation hearings because the available minutes and judgments in the
existing appellate record do not specify which probation violation allegations
Alcala admitted to, and which were withdrawn or dismissed at those earlier
hearings.

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

In her motion to reconsider the Idaho

Supreme Court's order denying her motion to augment the record, Alcala notes
that the requested transcripts revealed that Aclala did not admit changing her
residence without permission or actively avoiding supervision during her second
probation violation admission hearing in December 2007, and did not admit to
failing to pay required monthly supervision fees or refusing a BAG breath test
during her third probation violation admission hearing in March 2009. 3 (2/27/12
Motion to Reconsider, pp.3-5.) Alcala, however, has not attempted to argue that
3

The transcripts Alcala attached to her motion to reconsider also reveal that
while she did not admit these four allegations, she did admit the other 10
allegations across the second and third reports of probation violation. (2/27/12
Motion to Reconsider, attachments.)
15

the district court considered this information several years later in revoking
Alcala's probation after her fourth and fifth reports of probation violation, and in
imposing sentence on her new felony DUI conviction.
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation or even sentencing determinations in separate cases, Alcala has failed
to show that any such circumstances apply here. It is Alcala's appellate burden
to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate
appellate record. The augmentations she sought, however, were of then-never
before prepared transcripts of hearings held months, or even years, before the
state filed its fourth and fifth reports of probation violation and charged Alcala
with felony DU I. Alcala has failed to point to anything in the record that would
indicate that statements made at these prior hearings were considered or played
any role in the court's decisions in March 2011 to revoke Alcala's probation in the
battery on a law enforcement officer case and to enter a unified eight-year
sentence for the felony DUI conviction.
As such, Alcala has failed to show that such transcripts are necessary to
complete an adequate record on this appeal. Because all of the evidence before
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate
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review, and Alcala has failed to establish a violation of her due process rights. 4
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Further, Alcala's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court violated her due
process rights lacks merit because Alcala was afforded the opportunity, prior to
the settling of the appellate record, to designate not only the standard clerk's
record, but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on
appeal. I.AR. 28(a) and (c).

Therefore, Alcala was provided the process by

which she could designate all documents in the record she believed were
necessary for appeal. While I.AR. 30 provides that a party may move the Idaho
Supreme Court to add to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right
to such augmentation. Alcala has failed to show that the ability to designate
records for appellate review under I.AR. 28 was insufficient to afford due
process in her case.
Alcala has also failed to establish that denial of her request to augment
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied her equal protection.
Alcala cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.10-14 (citing,~.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record
4

As a component of her due process claim, Alcala argues that the denial of her
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived her of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Alcala has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's order revoking her probation or its sentencing determination, there
is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Alcala of
effective assistance of counsel on this appeal.
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that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Alcala's request
for transcripts solely because she is indigent.

In fact, Alcala's motion to

reconsider was denied even though the transcripts had already been prepared by
Cassia County, and even though granting the motion to augment would thus
have required no additional public expenditure.
Reconsider, p.2, attachments.)

(See 2/27/12 Motion to

The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party

seeking augmentation to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation
requested. I.AR. 30. Alcala's motion to augment was denied because she failed
to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon all parties, of showing that the
transcripts were necessary or even helpful in addressing appellate issues. The
Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied the motion to augment because
Alcala failed to make a showing that any appellant - indigent or otherwise would be entitled to augment the record as requested.
Alcala has failed to show that the denial of her motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by her indigence, nor has she demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue she raised on appeal. To the contrary, the record amply demonstrates
that Alcala's motion to augment was properly denied because she failed to show
that the transcripts she requested were necessary for adequate review of the
district court's decision to revoke her probation in the battery on a law
enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882), or the district court's sentencing
determination in the felony DUI case (Docket No. 38883). Because Alcala has
failed to show her due process or equal protection rights were implicated, much
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less violated, by the denial of her motion to augment, she has failed to show any
basis for relief.

11.
Alcala Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Alcala asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed

a unified sentence of eight years with two years fixed upon her guilty plea to
felony driving under the influence. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-22.) Alcala has failed
to establish an abuse of discretion, considering the objectives of sentencing, her
extensive criminal history, and her failures complying in with community
supervision.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

&

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is
excessive.

Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the

sentence is excessive, she must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
19

protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

~

Idaho appellate

courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 896, 980 P.2d
552, 560 (1999).
In this case, the district court considered the appropriate sentencing
factors. (3/29/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.5-12.) The court also ordered and considered a
new presentence investigation report, substance abuse evaluation, and mental
health evaluation.

(12/30/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-7; 3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.43,

L.16.)
The district court referenced Alcala's prior criminal history, which is
extensive.

This was Alcala's fourth conviction for driving under the influence.

(2/22/11 PSI, pp.3-7.)

Alcala's criminal history also reflects numerous other

alcohol and driving-related misdemeanor charges and convictions, as well as at
least two convictions for obstructing and delaying police officers.

(Id.) At the

time of her sentencing on the felony DUI, Alcala was more than six years into an
exceedingly unsuccessful probation for battery on a law enforcement officer. (Id.;
see generally #38882 R., Vol. I, Vol. II; #38883 R.)
The district court also expressed its concern with the facts of the felony
DUI case.

(3/29/11 Tr., p.42, Ls.12-18.)

After the officer activated his

emergency overhead lights, Alcala accelerated her vehicle down an alleyway,
drove for several more blocks, pulled into a driveway, and then tried to flee the
scene on foot. (#38883 R., p.18.) Alcala resisted and kicked at the officer who
tried to arrest her, continuing a pattern of physical resistance against law
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enforcement officers. (Id.) Alcala then refused the breathalyzer test. (Id.) A
blood draw returned a BAC of .204. (2/22/11 PSI, p.2, attachments.)
Alcala contends that the district court's sentence was excessive in light of
mitigating factors she presented, including her childhood physical and emotional
abuse, history of substance addiction, mental health issues, occasional success
on probation in other cases, and willingness to accept treatment. (Appellant's
brief, pp.19-22.)

However, the district court did expressly consider these

mitigating factors in its sentencing analysis.

(3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.44,

L.18.) The court also agreed to run Alcala's felony DUI sentence concurrently
with her sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer following her probation
revocation on the latter charge. (#38883 R., p.104.)
After considering the facts of the case and applying the objectives of
criminal punishment, the district court reasonably determined that imposing a
unified eight-year sentence with two years fixed for Alcala's felony driving under
the influence conviction was appropriate.

Under any reasonable view of the

facts, Alcala has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

111.
Alcala Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking Her Probation
A.

Introduction
Alcala contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking her

probation after her fourth and fifth reports of probation violation in light of her
"newfound desire for treatment and willingness to adhere to treatment."
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(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) Alcala's argument does not establish an abuse of
discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district

court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)).

C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Revoking Alcala's ·
Probation
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717.
The district court's decision to revoke Alcala's probation was primarily, and
properly, based on Alcala's excessively poor performance on probation. (3/29/11
Tr., p.44, L.19 - p.45, L. 10.) Alcala was originally arrested for battery on a law
enforcement officer on October 20, 2003. (11/30/04 PSI, p.2.) As thoroughly
discussed above, the next seven and a half years before the district court
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revoked probation consisted of multiple failures to appear, probation violations,
continued alcohol consumption, two new convictions for driving under the
influence (the latter of which was a felony), and at least six other new
misdemeanor convictions. (2/22/11 PSI, pp.3-7; see generally #38882 R., Vol. I,
Vol. 11; #38883 R.)
Alcala contends that the district court abused its discretion in light of the
mitigating factors discµssed above in her excessive sentence argument, as well
as her "newfound desire to obtain treatment."

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.)

However, the district court did consider the mitigating factors and Alcala's future
rehabilitative prospects. (3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.44, L.18.) The fact that the
district court did not revoke Alcala's probation until after the fourth and fifth
reports of probation violation and after two periods of retained jurisdiction reflects
the court's commitment to providing Alcala with every opportunity to succeed on
community supervision. The district court stated:
What I want to try to distinguish is dealing with the crime that
you committed, which is a serious crime, and your treatment and
recovery needs for the future so you can have a crime-free life, and
that's the balancing part that's the most difficult thing I have to do.
But as I look through and consider your age, your history,
particularly the inability that you have even with all the treatment
that's been offered and all the efforts that have been made by the
state to lead you to treatment and to hope that the treatment is
successful, in the end it's your decision, and you haven't chosen to
make it successful. And maybe you will some day. I hope you do,
because otherwise I'm afraid that the life you've had the last ten
years is the life you are going to have for the next 40, and it's a
dreadful life, and it's one that need not be, but in the end it's going
to be your choice.
So putting all those things together, I conclude you're not a
candidate for probation at all and that at this point I don't see any
purpose in having another retained jurisdiction program to consider
23

you for probation. I think that you can obtain treatment while in
custody and would encourage you to seek out and participate in the
therapeutic treatment community at your earliest option.
(3/29/11 Tr., p.43, L. 17 - p.44, L. 18.)
That Alcala believes the district court should have placed her on a third
period of retained jurisdiction or reinstated her probation for a fourth time does
not establish an abuse of discretion. This is particularly true where, as here,
Alcala was given multiple opportunities to rehabilitate in the community, but
continued to violate her probation.

Because Alcala has failed to establish the

district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and ordering her
sentence executed, she is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Alcala's probation
DATED this 26th day of June 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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